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Abstract 
With the London Interbank Offer Rate (LIBOR) likely to disappear at the end of 2021 due to its 
manipulation during the 2008 financial crisis, the financial industry must decide what to do about 
legacy contracts tied to LIBOR and must select a new interest rank benchmark regime going 
forwards. This paper provides insight into those questions by first contributing to the existing 
literature aimed at measuring the extent of LIBOR manipulation and then by developing a model 
to explain the LIBOR-SOFR spread. This paper analyzes banks’ LIBOR submissions from 2006 
to 2008 to identify bank collusion to strategically increase or decrease LIBOR to benefit their 
traders with LIBOR exposure. It then uses macro-economic data to show that LIBOR and SOFR 
diverge during periods of financial turmoil, and on the basis of these results makes a 
recommendation for how the financial industry should transition from LIBOR. 
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1   Introduction 
The London Interbank Offer Rate (LIBOR) has long been considered one of the most 
important numbers in the world. It is used as a benchmark for an estimated $350 trillion in various 
debt instruments and other financial products. However, in 2008 it was discovered that many major 
financial institutions had reported false interest rates to manipulate LIBOR to their own advantage. 
Britain’s Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) has agreed to continue to support LIBOR only until 
the end of 2021. What exactly will happen after 2021 is subject to speculation. However, it is clear 
that the financial sector must seriously consider alternatives to LIBOR. 
The impetus for this paper was to answer this question: how should we replace USD 
LIBOR? However, before trying to solve the immediate problem, there are a number of other 
questions that we might want to answer. What were the motivations behind the manipulation of 
LIBOR and how severe were their effects on the rate? Is it likely that LIBOR is still being 
manipulated? Is a transition away from LIBOR even necessary? With these questions in mind, this 
paper will be split into two parts. The first section contributes to the existing literature that has 
aimed to measure the extent of LIBOR manipulation surrounding the 2008 financial crisis. This 
provides insight into whether a transition is necessary at all and how LIBOR would have behaved 
in the absence of manipulation. This is important because many parties invested in LIBOR-based 
derivatives might be wary about selecting a replacement rate on the basis that it closely tracks 
LIBOR given that LIBOR may have been significantly different from bank’s true borrowing costs 
during the great recession and potentially afterwards. 
The second section discusses the general benefits and disadvantages associated with 
departing from LIBOR and analyzes whether the Federal Reserve’s proposed alternative to LIBOR 
is adequate for individuals with LIBOR exposure. This section attempts to use macro-economic 
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variables to explain the differing behavior between LIBOR and the Federal Reserve’s alternative, 
the Secured Overnight Financing Rate (SOFR). 
2  The Manipulation of LIBOR 
During the financial crisis, USD LIBOR was calculated by the British Bankers’ 
Association (BBA) and published by Thompson Reuters. Each day the BBA would survey a panel 
of 16 major banks from all over the world, asking the question, “At what rate could you borrow 
funds, were you to do so by asking for and then accepting inter-bank offers in a reasonable market 
size just prior to 11 am?” Then, the BBA would discard the four highest and lowest responses and 
publish the average response from the remaining 8 banks. They would do this for each of the 15 
different maturities for which USD LIBOR was calculated and publish the results at 11:30 am each 
day. 
 In 2008, LIBOR rates spiked after the Lehman Brother’s Collapse and diverged 
significantly from the federal funds rate. This prompted investigations by the Wall Street Journal, 
Britain’s Financial Services Authority, the US Commodity Futures Trading Commission, and 
other parties in the subsequent years. The submitters to LIBOR were fined over $9 Billion in total 
and numerous traders faced criminal charges for their roles in the manipulation of LIBOR.1 The 
messages between traders uncovered by the CFTC’s investigation into Barclays show just how 
explicit the manipulation was: 
“WE HAVE TO GET KICKED OUT OF THE FIXINGS TOMORROW!! 
We need a 4.17 fix in 1m (low fix) We need a 4.41 fix in 3m (high fix)” 
(November 22, 2005, Senior Trader in New York to Trader in London). 
 
1 This timeline by the New York Times references most of the major fines and criminal charges. 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/04/23/business/dealbook/db-libor-timeline.html#/#time370_10983 
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The obvious problem with the way that LIBOR had been designed was that banks who were 
exposed to changes in LIBOR through their derivatives contracts would have a significant 
incentive to purposely misstate their survey responses with little cost to doing so. The rate is 
calculated as a truncated mean, which helps dampen the effects of this sort of manipulation. 
However, traders at LIBOR submitting banks colluded at times to get the rates they wanted.2 
 Prior to 2013, the banks’ individual responses to the BBA were made publicly available, 
along with the overall rate itself. Perhaps this was done to increase scrutiny on banks and prevent 
them from misreporting. When the economy was strong, no significant problems arose. However, 
once the financial crisis struck, banks had an incentive to underreport their true borrowing costs 
(or what their true borrowing costs might have been if banks were lending to each other at all). If 
a bank reported a high rate to LIBOR, investors might become more fearful about that bank’s 
ability to repay its obligations. Although this incentive for manipulation has received less public 
attention than the traders’ explicit requests, its ultimate effect on LIBOR during the financial crisis 
is likely the larger of the two. All banks experienced this incentive in some form throughout the 
financial crisis whereas trader’s incentives likely did not last as long and offset each other at times. 
This problem was made worse by the fact that interbank lending largely disappeared during the 
financial crisis, making it more difficult for regulators to determine the extent to which banks were 
being truthful in their LIBOR submissions. 
 This first half of the paper discusses the existing literature that has attempted to identify 
and quantify the manipulation of LIBOR. It then contributes to that literature by developing a 
model that attempts to explain daily changes in LIBOR submissions. 
 
 
2 Messages and testimony to support this claim were uncovered in the CFTC’s investigation into Barclays. 
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2.1  Literature Review 
The academic literature on the manipulation of LIBOR has generally been guided by goals 
other than the desire to provide insight for the transition away from LIBOR. For example, recently 
King and Lewis (2019) attempt to differentiate the impact of credit risk and liquidity on LIBOR 
during the financial crisis. In order to do this, they account for the motivations that led to the 
manipulation of LIBOR. Prior to this, Brousseau et al. (2009) demonstrated how strong statistical 
relationships among rates disappeared following the Lehman collapse, potentially because of 
manipulation (although they don’t attribute it to this cause explicitly). Snider and Youle (2012) 
use the spread in funding costs by currency as evidence of LIBOR manipulation. Prior to the 
financial crisis, a common method for measuring interbank lending costs was to infer them from 
funds-transfers in payments-systems records, as in Furfine (1999). However, this method is no 
help when no transactions occur, as was often the case during the financial crisis. For this reason, 
even if banks submitting to LIBOR only intended to be truthful, their submissions still would’ve 
been somewhat arbitrary. With this in mind, we should reframe our goal to identify the rate that a 
well-intentioned banker would have submitted in response to the LIBOR survey, since there was 
no such thing as a bank’s “true” interbank funding cost. More recent work (Poskitt and 
Dassanayake, 2015; Gandhi et. al., 2018; King and Lewis, 2019) has attempted to model the 
fundamental determinants of interbank costs to measure what LIBOR should have been without 
manipulation.  
These authors model each borrowing bank’s true funding cost as function of a time-varying 
market-wide liquidity premium and the bank’s counterparty credit risk. Taylor and Williams 
(2009) use this approach immediately following the erratic behavior of LIBOR in 2008. They 
identify three main arguments used by traders to explain the behavior of LIBOR during that period: 
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counterparty risk, the liquidity premium, and future expectations. LIBOR is meant to represent an 
unsecured rate, and since the banks’ perceived risk of default grew during the financial crisis, many 
authors account for this by including banks’ CDS spreads as a proxy for credit risk. Traders also 
point to the change in the liquidity premium following the onset of the great recession. There are 
two main explanations for the liquidity premium. The first is that traders were reluctant to expose 
their bank’s funds during a period where those funds might be needed. The second is that bank’s 
needed liquidity to make their balance sheets look respectable in end-of-year financial reports. 
Finally, expectations regarding future interest rates became more uncertain. Towards the end of 
2007, the target federal funds rate, the effective federal funds rate, and LIBOR began to diverge. 
Taylor and Williams as well as many following authors have used OIS spreads to adjust for 
expectations about future interest rates. 
King and Lewis go on to attempt to capture the costs and benefits of manipulation by 
including the standard deviation of CDS spreads as well as the individual banks’ deviations from 
the mean CDS spread in their model. They recognize that banks feared that by submitting a rate 
much higher than its peers, it might signal that it was in financial trouble. Although all of the 
LIBOR submitting banks shared this motivation to some extent, those banks with higher CDS 
spreads would have had an even greater incentive to understate their funding costs. In addition, 
banks may also have worried that reporting a value much different from their peers might bring 
unwanted regulatory scrutiny. 
?̂?𝑖𝑚𝑡 = 𝜆𝑚𝑡 +  𝜙𝑡𝐶𝑖𝑚𝑡 +  β1,𝑖𝑡𝜎𝑚𝑡
𝐶 +  𝛽2,𝑡(𝐶𝑖𝑚𝑡 −  𝐶?̅?𝑡) +  𝜖𝑖𝑚𝑡                            (1)   
Equation (1) is the basic model used by King and Lewis where 𝜆𝑚𝑡 is the liquidity premium, 𝐶𝑖𝑚𝑡 
is a particular bank’s credit risk (proxied by their CDS spread), and 𝜙𝑡 is the sensitivity to that 
credit risk. 
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However, this model only explicitly incorporates reputational concerns, and while 
reputational concerns were likely a larger factor in driving the overall LIBOR rate as discussed 
earlier, we should not ignore the traders’ incentives for manipulation. The various investigations 
into the manipulating institutions by the CFTC and other government organizations have 
highlighted the messages between traders requesting a particular LIBOR submission for that day. 
However, these uncovered messages presumably only provide evidence of a small portion of the 
total manipulation that occurred on these grounds. Snider and Youle (2012) attempt to differentiate 
this type of rate-targeting manipulation by looking at how submissions bunched around pivotal 
quotes. Since LIBOR is calculated as a truncated mean (only the middle 8 quotes are used to 
calculate LIBOR), the marginal benefit of reporting a higher rate becomes 0 after a point. Snider 
and Youle (2012) find that submissions were bunched more tightly around these pivotal quotes 
than one would expect to happen in the absence of manipulation. While this provides strong 
evidence to suggest that banks colluded with each other – or at least were aware of what other 
banks would submit prior to making their own submissions – it does not tell us how large the effect 
of this type of manipulation was on LIBOR or how long it lasted. 
Ghandi et al. (2018) attempt to show that banks’ LIBOR submissions responded to their 
LIBOR exposure. However, because there is no publicly available information for banks’ LIBOR 
exposure, they estimate a rolling-window regression separately for each bank-maturity pair that 
attempts to establish a relationship between changes in LIBOR and weekly returns for that bank. 
They use the coefficient associated with changes in LIBOR submissions as a proxy for a given 
bank’s LIBOR exposure. They then use that proxy to explain monthly changes in banks’ 
subsequent LIBOR submissions. Although they provide some evidence to support their proxy, it 
is still somewhat unclear whether it accurately captures a bank’s LIBOR exposure. Furthermore, 
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evidence from prior investigations into the LIBOR-submitting banks suggests that traders did not 
make requests for LIBOR manipulation that lasted more than a few days. Therefore, it is not 
surprising that their model captures less than 3 percent of the variation in monthly LIBOR 
submissions. Their model, like that of Snider and Youle, provides evidence of profit-driven 
LIBOR manipulation, but does not give an estimate of the extent of the effect of this type of 
manipulation. 
A majority of the papers on this subject only provide evidence that manipulation existed 
rather than its extent. However, most recent work has provided fairly consistent estimates of the 
extent of the manipulation 
Table 1. Prior estimates of LIBOR manipulation 
Author Estimate of Manipulation at 
peak of crisis 
Youle, 2014 -8 basis points 
Poskitt and Dassanayake, 2015 -30 to -40 basis points 
Bonaldi, 2017 -30 basis points 
King and Lewis, 2019 -35 basis points 
These results suggest that the difference between LIBOR and other interest rates during the 
crisis should have been even greater than it actually was although the effect of LIBOR 
underreporting was small relative to the size of the spread between LIBOR and other rates. 
2.2  Data/Methods 
 Since previous researchers have already quantified manipulation on reputational grounds 
or have estimated the movement in LIBOR that cannot be explained by conventional determinants 
of interbank funding costs, the purpose of this section is to investigate the manipulation and 
collusion led by the banks’ derivatives positions. Snider and Youle’s results suggest that on days 
when banks colluded – particularly to increase LIBOR – the submissions around the critical quote 
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(where the critical quote is the fifth highest and lowest LIBOR submission for each day) are more 
closely bunched together. To capture this effect, we take the overall standard deviation in LIBOR 
submissions, the standard deviation of the eight highest submissions, and the standard deviation 
of the eight lowest submissions for each day at each maturity. We also attempt to control for the 
conventional variables that would account for changes in LIBOR submissions to the extent that 
the necessary data was available. In particular we use a fixed-effects model of the following form: 
𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑡 = β1ΔFFt + β2Δ𝐶𝑖𝑡 +  β3Δ𝜎𝑚𝑡
𝐿 +  𝛽4Δ𝜎𝑚𝑡
𝐿8 +  𝛽5Δ𝜎𝑚𝑡
𝐿16 +  𝜖𝑖𝑚𝑡 + 𝑎𝑖𝑚             (2)            
where 𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑡 is the LIBOR submission for bank i, maturity m, at time t. ΔFFt is the change in the 
Federal Funds Rate, Δ𝐶𝑖𝑚𝑡 is the change in CDS spread, and Δ𝜎𝑚𝑡
𝐿 , Δ𝜎𝑚𝑡
𝐿8 , and Δ𝜎𝑚𝑡
𝐿16 are the 
changes in the standard deviation of all LIBOR submissions, the lowest eight LIBOR 
submissions, and the highest eight LIBOR submissions respectively. 
We obtain LIBOR submission data from 2005 until the end of 2008.3 Without data after 
this point, it is difficult to say with confidence whether LIBOR manipulation continued after the 
financial crisis. Nonetheless, the period of 2005 to 2008 is the most interesting period for our 
purposes. Evidence from the investigation into Barclays suggests that the traders began 
manipulating LIBOR in 2005, and most of LIBOR’s erratic behavior occurred towards the end of 
2007 and during 2008. 
 CDS data was obtained via a third party from Markit, which is the same source used in 
most studies in this literature. Unfortunately, we were only able to get data for banks that currently 
submit to LIBOR rather than those that submitted during the financial crisis. We have CDS data 
for 10 of the 16 banks that submitted to LIBOR starting in 2006. One might fear that the banks for 
 
3 Thompson Reuters (the previous publisher for LIBOR data) no longer has submissions data, and the ICE 
Benchmark Administration Ltd. does not publish banks’ LIBOR submissions, but Bloomberg has Libor submissions 
past 2008. Unfortunately, we did not have access to Bloomberg when collecting data for this paper. 
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which we have data might importantly differ from the other six banks that submitted to LIBOR at 
that time. For example, one might be concerned that the banks who most actively manipulated 
LIBOR during the financial crisis would have been eliminated from the pool of LIBOR banks. 
However, our sample contains many of the banks that faced the most severe punishments for 
LIBOR manipulation such as the Union Bank of Switzerland, the Royal Bank of Scotland, and 
Barclays. 
It should also be noted that Markit CDS quotes are obtained from dealers and likely contain 
a mix of transaction and model-based information. If the model-based quotes diverge 
systematically from transaction-based quotes (for example if model-based quotes are more 
conservative than actual transactions), then this might introduce additional uncertainty to the proxy 
for counterparty risk. This is an unavoidable issue faced by all users of CDS data but is nonetheless 
something that we should be aware of when making conclusions on the basis of this data. 
Additionally, credit default swaps use different conventions for what characterizes a credit 
event for the purposes of the swap. The three main conventions used during this time were the 
XR14, CR14, and MM14. We chose to use the convention for which there is the most data 
available for each bank. The CDS convention used has a very slight effect on the CDS spread. 
However, we use a fixed effects model which transforms the data by mean differencing each 
variable for each bank-maturity across all T so the choice of convention would not affect the results 
unless it also affects the variation in CDS spreads. However, this does not appear to be the case. 
The difference in CDS spreads for any given bank under different conventions is relatively 
constant over the period. 
We run an augmented dickey fuller test to confirm that both LIBOR Submissions and CDS 
spreads are non-stationary from 2006 to 2008 so we transform those variables by using the first 
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difference rather than their absolute value. Figures 1 and 2 show the CDS Spreads and 3M LIBOR 
submissions for Bank of America before and after transformation to avoid spurious regression 
problems. 
Figure 1. Bank of America 3M Libor Submissions 
 
While this graph only shows the 3M LIBOR submissions for Bank of America, they closely 
describe the behavior of 3M LIBOR more generally. It is important to note that the change in Bank 
of America’s LIBOR submissions is negatively skewed. This is true across all 10 banks in the 
sample. One might hypothesize that this is because their CDS spreads are negatively skewed as 
well, but as we show, the change in CDS spreads does little to explain the daily variation in banks’ 
LIBOR submissions. It makes sense that banks would be more willing to significantly decrease 
than increase their LIBOR submissions because they might worry about the reputational damage 
of increasing their LIBOR submission significantly relative to other banks.  
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Figure 2. Bank of America CDS Spreads 
 
Unfortunately, we were unable to obtain OIS spreads for each of the LIBOR maturities. 
Typically, these models subtract maturity matched OIS spreads from LIBOR submissions to 
account for the effects of future interest rate expectations on LIBOR. While it would of course be 
preferable to have access to this data, there is no reason to think that the results would be biased 
without their inclusion. 
2.3  Results/Discussion 
 We start by implementing a model that includes only the change in the federal funds rate 
and the change in CDS spreads to see whether the conventional variables explain much of the 
variation in the changes in LIBOR submissions. Then with later models we include variables that 
we hypothesized might represent the manipulative and collusive behaviors taken by the LIBOR 
submitters.  
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Table 2. Panel Data Regression Results 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Adjusted R2 0.0001 0.0045 0.3786 0.3830 
Recession Indicator --- 
-0.0108*** 
(0.0009) 
-0.0110*** 
(0.0007) 
-0.0111*** 
(0.0007) 
Change in Fed Funds Rate 
0.0277*** 
(0.0028) 
3.4662*** 
(0.2214) 
0.0095*** 
(0.0020) 
0.0083*** 
(0.0020) 
1-Day change in CDS Spread 
1.9538*** 
(0.4778) 
--- --- --- 
1-Week Change in CDS Spread  --- 
0.0261*** 
(0.0026) 
0.4970** 
(0.0331) 
0.4771** 
(0.1750) 
Change in St. Dev. of all LIBOR 
Submissions 
--- --- 
2.8918*** 
(0.0418) 
0.9628*** 
(0.1226) 
Change in St. Dev. of all LIBOR 
submissions*Recession 
Indicator 
--- --- --- 
1.9951*** 
(0.1192) 
Change in Standard Deviation of 
8 highest LIBOR submissions 
--- --- 
-0.7320*** 
(0.0331) 
-0.7544*** 
(0.0331) 
Change in St. Dev. Of 8 lowest 
LIBOR submissions 
--- --- 
-0.4720*** 
(0.0324) 
0.7525*** 
(0.1200) 
Change in St. Dev. of 8 lowest 
LIBOR submissions*Recession 
Indicator 
--- --- --- 
-1.2693*** 
(0.1197) 
***p<0.001 **p<0.01 
In the first model, we only include the change in the federal funds rate and the change in 
the banks’ CDS spreads. Although both variables are statistically significant, with an adjusted R2 
of 0.0001, this model explains almost none of the variation in LIBOR submissions. It is 
unsurprising that the change in CDS spreads explains so little. LIBOR submitters would be 
unlikely to react so quickly to changes in CDS spreads, especially when there are so many other 
factors that might sway them every day. We then try using the change in CDS spreads over the 
past week, which only improves the model slightly. However, in later iterations of the model, the 
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1-day change in CDS spreads is not statistically significant, whereas the 1-week change is. It also 
just seems more reasonable to think that there would be some lag between changes in the CDS 
market and LIBOR submitters responding to those changes. However, if interbank lending actually 
had existed during the period, then the response would likely have been more immediate. 
We also rerun model 2 after transforming the data into weekly data by taking the average 
weekly value for all of the relevant variables. This model explains 10 percent of the variation in 
average weekly LIBOR submission – a significant improvement over the same model on daily 
data. This suggests that while the changes in CDS spreads do little to explain the daily variation in 
LIBOR submissions, they do affect the overall level of LIBOR submissions over a longer time 
horizon, consistent with other methodologies that have attempted to explain LIBOR submissions 
using CDS spreads. 
Model 3 begins to test our hypothesis regarding bank collusion. This model includes the 
standard deviation in LIBOR submissions of the bottom 8 submissions, the top 8 submissions, and 
all 16 submissions. It is important to incorporate a variable for the total variation in LIBOR 
submissions because it can act as a proxy for general financial conditions. When the recession 
worsened, some banks fared better than others, and so the variation in CDS spreads and LIBOR 
submissions grew (although perhaps not as much as one might expect). 
The variables of particular interest are the change in the standard deviation of the 8 lowest 
and highest LIBOR submissions. We hypothesized that reduced variation in the 8 highest LIBOR 
submissions was evidence of manipulation and would therefore correspond with a higher rate on 
that day. Therefore, it is not surprising that the coefficient associated with this variable is negative. 
It is clear why LIBOR submitters would not want to report an unnecessarily high rate since it could 
have negative reputational effects. 
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The motivations for colluding in order to get a low rate were less significant. The primary 
motivation, however, would be avoiding the regulatory scrutiny that a bank might draw if it 
submitted a drastically lower rate. For this reason, we would expect lower variation in the bottom 
eight LIBOR submissions to signify collusion and correspond with a lower rate. However, the 
results from model 3 suggest the opposite. In order to gain more insight into this, and to control 
for the onset of the great recession, we include a dummy variable with a value of one for every 
day from the beginning of December 2007 and a value of zero for all other days in the sample. By 
interacting this variable with the other explanatory variables, we learn a couple important things. 
First, we learn that the change in the standard deviation of all LIBOR submissions had a 
larger relationship with LIBOR submissions during the great recession. This is not particularly 
surprising. If anything, it is somewhat surprising that the standard deviation of all LIBOR 
submissions was statistically significant at all before the great recession. More importantly, 
however, we learned that the relationship between changes in LIBOR submissions and the change 
in the standard deviation in the 8 lowest LIBOR submissions is different before and after the start 
of the great recession. Prior to December 2007, the data supports our original hypothesis regarding 
why the 8 lowest submitting banks might collude. After 2007, the relationship flips. Why might 
this be? Our revised hypothesis is that after the great recession hit, making an immediate profit off 
of LIBOR manipulation became less significant relative to the reputational damage a bank might 
incur by submitting a low rate.4 Now the less financially stable banks had an incentive to move 
their submissions closer that of other banks. However, they still wanted to move in step with other 
similar banks. 
 
4 During the investigation into Barclays, it was discovered that the bank had changed its strategy in exactly this way 
in response to greater scrutiny into its LIBOR submissions during and after the financial crisis. 
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Originally, the purpose of analyzing manipulation caused by collusion was to determine 
whether it might significantly affect our estimates regarding the overall misstatement of LIBOR. 
However, because we take the difference in LIBOR submissions as our left-hand side variable, it 
is difficult to say what the aggregate effect of manipulation on these grounds was. In order to gain 
some insight into this question, we measure the daily change in LIBOR submissions attributable 
to the variables that represent potentially collusive behavior – the standard deviation in the 8 
highest and lowest LIBOR submissions. Then we add the effect on day 1, to that on day 2 and so 
on to get an aggregate effect of collusion. Of course, this also increases the uncertainty of our 
estimates with each subsequent day. Nonetheless, it gives a general sense for whether the 
manipulation importantly contributed to the misstatement of LIBOR. 
Figure 3. Aggregate Effect of Collusive Manipulation on 3M Libor 
 
 
Ultimately, collusive manipulation seems to have had very little impact on three-month 
LIBOR. It typically only affected the rate on any given day by a few basis points. The only point 
 
 
 
 
 
16 
where the effect seems at all noticeable is following the Lehman Brothers collapse, but this does 
not seem indicative of collusion, but rather a complete lack thereof during that period of 
uncertainty. While traders at the LIBOR submitting banks may have made large sums via the 
collusive manipulation of LIBOR at the expense of other participants in the derivatives markets, 
the effect on the underlying assets tied to LIBOR seems to have been minimal. 
3  The Transition to SOFR 
Because LIBOR will potentially no longer exist after 2021, banks and investors will soon 
need to transition to some alternative rate. For the United States, it seems increasingly likely that 
the alternative will be the Secured Overnight Financing Rate (SOFR). Created in 2018 by the 
Federal Reserve, SOFR is calculated as a volume-weighted median of transaction level tri-party 
repo data. LIBOR and SOFR differ in a couple important ways. First, SOFR is transaction-based. 
This means that it would be far more costly to manipulate than LIBOR. Second, it is a secured 
rate, which might lead one to think that it would diverge from an unsecured rate like LIBOR during 
a recessionary period. Because the two rates have historically differed, any financial product that 
was originally tied to USD LIBOR will need some additional adjustment to SOFR.  
This section of the paper has two main goals: to identify the most reasonable adjustment to 
SOFR and to discuss whether the introduction of SOFR should necessarily entail the demise of 
LIBOR. 
3.1  Literature Review 
 The academic community has not yet weighed in regarding the exact adjustment to SOFR. 
However, some authors have made arguments regarding the proper benchmark regime going 
forwards. Duffie and Stein (2015) argue that one glaring problem is that LIBOR’s use in bank-
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related lending applications is overshadowed by trade in interest-rate derivatives tied to the same 
benchmark. As of 2014, an estimated $141 trillion in derivatives contracts were tied to USD 
LIBOR compared to only $7.4 trillion in loans.5 This means that even if the calculation of LIBOR 
were changed to be transaction-based, the incentive to manipulate would persist. It is for this 
reason that the Federal Reserve’s Alternative Reference Rates Committee (ARRC) recommended 
the Secured Overnight Financing Rate (SOFR) as a replacement for LIBOR. However, this is not 
necessarily a basis for abandoning something similar to the LIBOR benchmark altogether. Duffie 
and Stein argue that it is valuable to have a benchmark for hedging a bank’s loan funding costs 
and that some formulation of LIBOR should continue exist, but that for the majority of users of 
interest-rate derivatives who are simply aiming to make a speculative bet on market wide interest 
rates there should be a secondary benchmark such as SOFR. This idea that the departure from 
LIBOR is an opportunity to head towards a more ideal benchmark regime is an important point. 
However, as the problems associated with transitioning to SOFR loom especially large, it has 
received little discussion elsewhere in the academic literature. 
 The subsequent problem for transitioning to SOFR is to decide on the adjustment that 
should be made to minimize the change in the value of LIBOR-based contracts. While this has 
been the subject of multiple consultations by the ARRC and the International Swaps and 
Derivatives Association (ISDA), academics have so far paid it little attention. Perhaps in an 
attempt to simplify the complexity of making the transition to SOFR, both the ISDA and the ARRC 
have been satisfied to adjust SOFR based on the median historical difference between it and 
LIBOR. A recent ARRC consultation argued that because LIBOR spreads are stationary and 
typically revert to long run values within a year that using a static adjustment is reasonable. 
 
5 Calculated from data from the FSB’s 2014 report on interest rate benchmarks. https://www.fsb.org/wp-
content/uploads/r_140722b.pdf (p 243) 
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However, the LIBOR-SOFR spread could potentially diverge significantly in the interim. 
Therefore, in this section we will attempt to provide a dynamic adjustment based on 
macroeconomic variables. 
One alternative to using historical data to select the SOFR adjustment, proposed by Duffie 
(2018), is to use a conversion auction to determine a fixed compensation rate that would be given 
to LIBOR receivers. In a basic conversion auction, a bid consists of a pair (r, q) where r represents 
the compensation rate the bidder is willing to pay to convert the legacy contracts – up to the 
notional quantity q – to a new contract that pays the new rate (SOFR). The market clearing rate 
would also be applied to non-bidding market participants who had previously signed a protocol to 
convert their LIBOR contracts at the auction-determined compensation rate. This approach is 
appealing because it has the potential to circumvent some of the legal challenges that might arise 
when transitioning to SOFR and it avoids the need to explicitly use uncertain historical data when 
selecting the compensation rate. However, many of the details of such an approach are unclear. It 
would require the participation of numerous parties, and it could be difficult to ensure that major 
financial institutions don’t have an incentive to manipulate the outcomes of the auctions. For these 
reasons, it is still worthwhile to investigate other methods for setting the adjustment to SOFR. 
3.2  Data/Methods 
 SOFR and LIBOR have very different risk characteristics and only seem to significantly 
diverge during times of financial stress, so a constant adjustment seems unsatisfactory. However, 
running a simple model that takes into account macroeconomic variables faces two obstacles: (1) 
LIBOR was being manipulated during the financial crisis, and (2) SOFR did not exist during the 
financial crisis. 
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As we discuss in the first section, previous research has shown that the manipulation of 
LIBOR for reputational reasons was at most around 40 basis points, and collusive manipulation 
for immediate profit-driven motivations seems to have been even more minor. The adjustment 
between SOFR and LIBOR need not perfectly explain the difference between the two rates. Instead 
the adjustment just needs to be sufficient for investors to feel confident that it will account for the 
general differences in the behavior of LIBOR and SOFR during times of financial stress. 
 As for the second problem, although SOFR was only created in 2018, all of the necessary 
data to calculate the rate exists from 2014 onwards. Furthermore, the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York (FRBNY) has surveyed primary dealers each morning about their borrowing activity 
the previous day since 1998. Based on the results of that survey, they released the volume-weighted 
mean rate of the primary dealers' overnight Treasury General Collateral repo borrowing activity 
for the past 22 years. Furthermore, the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation (DTCC) releases 
their own GCF Repo Indexes that are based on a slightly different subset of transactions than those 
used to calculate SOFR. Since this is a subset of the actual data used to calculate SOFR, it functions 
as a fairly good proxy. We use the DTCC GCF Repo Data and FRBNY survey to create a proxy 
for SOFR going back to before the start of the financial crisis. This proxy along with actual SOFR 
data from 2014 onwards allows us to develop a model to explain the difference between three-
month USD LIBOR and SOFR. A similar approach would need to be taken for every maturity. 
We focus exclusively on the three-month maturity here because it is used for a majority of the 
derivatives tied to LIBOR. 
We obtain historical data for the S&P 500, the VIX, and seasonally adjusted housing starts 
over the same period to explain the behavior of the LIBOR-SOFR spread. Because housing starts 
data is only available on a monthly basis we calculate the average of SOFR, LIBOR, and the other 
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explanatory variables to produce a model using housing starts that attempts to explain the monthly 
LIBOR-SOFR spread in addition to a model that attempts to explain the daily spread. In particular 
we use a model of the following form: 
𝐿𝑡 − 𝑆𝑂𝐹𝑅𝑡 = β0 + β1VIXt + β2𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡
2  +  β3Δ𝑆𝑡  +  𝜖𝑡             (3)            
where VIXt is the VIX spread at the start of each day, and Δ𝑆𝑡 is the change in the S&P 500 on 
the previous day. For the monthly model, we use the average value for all these variables and 
include seasonally adjusted housing starts as a fourth explanatory variable.6 
3.3  Results/Discussion 
 We run a simple linear model that uses a combination of the FRBNY survey rate and DTCC 
GCF Repo Rate to estimate SOFR over the period during which the data overlap. Although the 
survey rate is a volume-weighted mean rate rather than the median that is used to calculate SOFR, 
and the DTCC GCF Repo Rate is based on a subset of the transactions used to calculate SOFR, 
the model explains 99.7 percent of the variance in SOFR. Given how well the proxy explains 
SOFR, we feel comfortable using it along with actual SOFR data to calculate the difference 
between SOFR and LIBOR. 
 
 
 
 
 
6 We also tried including the average CDS spread among the banks for which we already had data. However, 
because its inclusion significantly reduced the number of periods for which we had data and it did not improve the 
model much, we ultimately excluded this variable from the analysis. Additionally, one wouldn’t want to base the 
LIBOR-SOFR spread adjustment on CDS data since it can be more easily manipulated than the VIX. 
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Figure 4. SOFR vs SOFR Proxy 
 
Figure 5 gives us a better sense for how much LIBOR and SOFR diverged during the 
financial crisis. Most of the professional discussion around the LIBOR-SOFR adjustment has 
focused on data from the past 5 years when the two rates rarely diverged more than 50 basis points. 
As the COVID-19 pandemic has created economic uncertainty again the two rates have begun to 
diverge. 
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Figure 5. SOFR vs 3M LIBOR 
 
We first develop a model by transforming the daily data into monthly data and using a 
combination of VIX spreads and seasonally adjusted housing starts data to explain the difference 
between SOFR and LIBOR. This model explained 44 percent of the variation in the monthly 
SOFR-LIBOR spread. However, if we were to use this model to create an adjustment to SOFR, 
we would only have access to the previous month’s data. Therefore, while this model supports the 
idea that LIBOR and SOFR diverge during times of greater volatility, it would not be useful for 
setting an adjustment to SOFR going forward. 
Table 3. Time Series Regression Results 
Variable Model 1 
(Monthly) 
Model 2 
(Daily) 
Model 3 
(Daily) 
Model 4 
(Daily) 
Adjusted R2 0.4294 0.3256 0.3209 0.3726 
Intercept 
-0.4525* 
(0.1937) 
-0.0929*** 
(0.0127) 
-0.0835*** 
(0.0126) 
0.3022*** 
(0.0250) 
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Housing Starts 
0.0002* 
(0.0001) 
--- --- --- 
VIX Spread 
0.0333*** 
(0.0050) 
0.0258*** 
(0.0006) 
0.0253*** 
(0.0006) 
-0.0076*** 
(0.0020) 
VIX Spread Squared --- --- --- 
0.00053*** 
(0.00003) 
Change in S&P 500 --- 
0.0014*** 
(0.0003) 
--- --- 
***p<0.001 **p<0.01 *p<0.1 
We then try using daily data instead of monthly data. The VIX close from the previous day 
explains about one-third of the daily variation in the LIBOR-SOFR spread. The VIX has a positive 
relationship with the LIBOR-SOFR spread. However, when we include the VIX squared variable, 
the coefficient associated with the VIX becomes negative. This suggests that small increases in 
the VIX don’t have much of an effect on the LIBOR-SOFR spread, but large changes in the VIX 
do. 
Nonetheless, much of the variation in the LIBOR-SOFR spread remains unexplained. 
Another potential reason that the two rates diverge in times of financial stress unrelated to the VIX 
or the S&P 500 comes from the fact that SOFR is transaction based. We would expect cash lenders 
to increase the rate at which riskier borrowers will be charged. However, in especially bad financial 
conditions they might choose not to lend to those market participants entirely thereby driving down 
the median rate paid. This is a somewhat unavoidable downside to transitioning to a transaction-
based benchmark, but it suggests that a model like the one proposed here could be further improved 
by incorporating the change in the volume of transactions used to calculate SOFR. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
24 
Figure 6. LIBOR-SOFR Spread after adjustment 
 
 Figure 6 compares the average difference between LIBOR and SOFR each month after 
making an adjustment based on the above model and on the ARRC’s proposal. The ARRC’s 
proposal to add to SOFR the median difference between LIBOR and SOFR does surprisingly well. 
Using either adjustment, the LIBOR-SOFR spread is reduced to less than 50 basis points for almost 
every month. The only periods for which this is not true are the month following the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers in 2008 and the month following the COVID-19 outbreak. The model based on 
VIX spreads much better explains the LIBOR-SOFR spread in 2008. However, it over-adjusts for 
the corona virus pandemic whereas the ARRC’s methodology under-adjusts in both cases. Given 
the unique nature of the current economic downturn, it does not seem particularly worrisome that 
the VIX-based model poorly explains the current LIBOR-SOFR spread. The VIX-based model 
seems superior to the ARRCs methodology, but one might argue that the simplicity of the ARRC’s 
approach in part makes up for its reduced accuracy. 
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4  Conclusion 
 While the evidence of LIBOR manipulation necessitates some sort of change, it appears 
that the effects of the underreporting were less significant than one might initially fear. Prior 
authors have shown that reputational concerns caused banks to underreport by as much as 35 basis 
points. However, these reputational concerns are mostly irrelevant since LIBOR submissions are 
no longer made public. This paper shows that while collusive behavior motivated by the banks’ 
own LIBOR exposures explains much of the daily variation in LIBOR submissions, the overall 
effect of these activities rarely surpassed a few basis points. Furthermore, with increased regulatory 
scrutiny and the severe fines imposed on banks as a result of their behavior, it seems likely that 
bank collusion has declined significantly. 
Nonetheless, with LIBOR-based derivatives outweighing LIBOR-based loans nearly 20 to 
1, the incentives for manipulation remain problematic. Therefore, as seems increasingly likely, all 
LIBOR-based financial products should transition to SOFR at the end of 2021. This paper 
maintains that a dynamic adjustment is preferable to the sort of static adjustment currently under 
consideration by the ISDA and the ARRC. However future work will likely be needed to 
investigate whether the LIBOR-SOFR spread can be explained by other variables – specifically 
the change in the volume of the transactions used to calculate SOFR. Market participants 
dissatisfied with the recommendation made by the ARRC could choose to participate or accept the 
results of conversion auctions like those suggested by Duffie (2018). 
One problem with transitioning away from LIBOR is that banks would now face the risk 
of SOFR diverging from their cost of funds. For this reason, one might prefer that the loans tied to 
LIBOR and the swaps connected with those loans remain LIBOR-based after 2021. However, 
LIBOR is no longer a good representation of banks’ cost of funds. The volume of interbank loans 
 
 
 
 
 
26 
has declined to less than one-fifth of what it was prior to the 2008 financial crisis, and new capital 
requirements continue to pressure banks away from interbank lending. Therefore, it would be ideal 
that a new LIBOR+ be created to for the purposes of new loans and the swaps associated with 
those loans. LIBOR+ wouldn’t necessarily need be transaction-based so long as it accurately 
captured banks’ cost of funding. As argued by Duffie and Stein (2015), this LIBOR+ would be 
based on unsecured bank borrowing from all wholesale sources including nonbank investors in 
commercial paper and large denomination certificates of deposit. This sort of two benchmark 
regime would be ideal. Most interest rate derivatives would be tied to SOFR, but banks would still 
be able to make loans at their cost of funds. 
Nonetheless to smooth the process of transitioning away from LIBOR, all existing LIBOR-
based financial products will need to transition to SOFR. The COVID-19 pandemic has made it 
all the more clear that a static adjustment to SOFR is an unsatisfactory way to compensate LIBOR-
receivers. The LIBOR-SOFR spread grows during times of financial stress and therefore a 
dynamic adjustment like the one modeled in this paper is preferable. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
27 
References 
 
Abrantes-Metz, R. M., Kraten, M., Metz, A. D., and Seow, G. S. 2012. Libor manipulation? 
Journal of Banking and Finance 36:136-150. 
Armantier, O. and Copeland, A. 2012. Assessing the quality of 'fur_ne-based' algorithms. FRBNY 
Staff Report 575. 
Alternative Reference Rates Committee. 2020. ARRC consultation on Spread Adjustment 
Methodologies for Fallbacks in Cash Products Referencing USD LIBOR, January, 21. 
Bonaldi, P. 2017. Motives and Consequences of Libor Misreporting: How Much Can We Learn 
from Banks' Self-Reported Borrowing Rates? Working Paper. 
Bowman, D. 2019. Historical Proxies for the Secured Overnight Financing Rate. Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve. https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/feds-
notes/historical-proxies-for-the-secured-overnight-financing-rate-20190715.htm 
Chen, J. 2013. Libors poker: Interbank borrowing costs and strategic reporting. Working paper, 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2136871. 
Duffie, D. and Stein, J. C. 2015. Reforming libor and other _nancial-market benchmarks. Journal 
of Economic Perspectives 29:191-212. 
Duffie, D. 2018. Compression Auctions with an Application to LIBOR-SOFR Swap Conversion. 
Working paper. 
Filipovi_c, D. and Trolle, A. B. 2013. The term structure of interbank risk. Journal of Financial 
Economics 109:707-733. 
Furfine, C. 1999. The Microstructure of the Federal Funds Market. Financial Markets, 
Institutions, and Instruments 8:24-44. 
Gandhi, P., Golez, B., Jackwerth, J. C., and Plazzi, A. 2018. Financial market misconduct and 
public enforcement: The case of libor manipulation. Management Science. In press. 
King, T. and Lewis, K. 2019. Credit Risk, Liquidity, and Lies. Working paper. 
Market Participants Group on Reforming Interest Rate Benchmarks. 2014. Final Report.
 Financial Stability Board, March, 14. 
Poskitt, R. and Dassanayake, W. 2015. Modelling the lowballing of the LIBOR fixing. 
International Review of Financial Analysis 42:270-277. 
Snider, C. A. and Youle, T. 2012. The fix is in: Detecting portfolio driven manipulation of the 
libor. Working paper, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2189015. 
Taylor, J. B. and Williams, J. C. 2009. A black swan in the money market. American Economic 
Journal: Macroeconomics 1:58-83. 
 
 
 
 
 
28 
US Commodities Futures Trading Commission. 2012. United States of America before the  
Commodities Futures Trading Commission, in the matter of Barclays PLC, Barclays 
Bank PLC and Barclays Capital Inc. CFTC Docket No. 12-25. 
Wheatly, M. 2012. The wheatly review of libor: Final report. Technical report, HM Treasury. 
Youle, T. 2014. How much did manipulation distort the libor? Working paper, 
http://www.dartmouth.edu/ tyoule/documents/JMP49 0112.pdf. 
